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ATOMIC BOMB TESTING AND THE WARNER
AMENDMENT: A VIOLATION OF THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
William A. Fletcher*
Abstract: Hundreds of thousands of American soldiers and civilians
were exposed to radiation during atmospheric tests of atomic bombs
between 1946 and 1963. An undetermined number of them are now ill
or dead from diseases traceable to that exposure. In the early 1980s,
some of the soldiers and civilians, or their survivors, brought damage
suits against the private contractors that had helped the United States
government carry out the tests. In 1984, Congress interfered with the
judicial process by passing the Warner Amendment, which retroactively
provided sovereign immunity to the contractors and required dismissal
of the suits. Professor Fletcher shows that the Warner Amendment was
passed for the specific purpose of requiring dismissal of the suits,
thereby protecting the government and its contractors from the legal
consequences of acts long since completed. Professor Fletcher then
argues that the Warner Amendment's intrusion into the judicial process
violates the Separation of Powers.
This is a story of irresponsibility, deceit, and betrayal. It begins
shortly after World War II, in 1946, when the United States tested two
atomic bombs at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The atmos-
pheric testing of atomic weapons went on intermittently for the next
seventeen years, both in the Pacific and in Nevada. The last American
atmospheric testing was performed in 1963 at the Nevada Test Site
northwest of Las Vegas. During this testing, hundreds of tiousands of
active duty servicemen were exposed to significant doses of radiation.'
Over one hundred thousand more civilians downwind from the
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley; B.A., 1968, Harvard College; B.A.,
1970, Oxford University; J.D., 1975, Yale Law School.
I have testified in Congress three times in support of a repeal of the Warner Amendment, and
drafted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Konizeski v. Livermore Labs, 108 S. Ct. 1076
(1988)(cert. denied).
1. Estimates of the exact number vary. The United States Defense Department estimates that
210,000 soldiers participated in the tests. The National Association of Atomic Veterans
estimates the figure at between 250,000 and 400,000. H. WASSERMAN & N. SOLOMON, KILLING
OUR OwN: THE DISASTER OF AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE WITH ATOMIC RADIATION 303 n.12
(1982).
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Nevada tests were exposed to significant radiation.2 An undetermined
number of those people are now ill or dead from radiation-induced
diseases traceable to that exposure.
The United States government is immune from suit by those who
were soldiers at the time of their exposure under the sovereign immu-
nity-based doctrine of Feres v. United States,3 and is significantly pro-
tected against suits by exposed civilians under the sovereign immunity-
based "discretionary function" exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act.4 But the government has been significantly assisted in perform-
ing these tests by a number of private contractors that did not have the
sovereign immunity-based defenses of the government. Those con-
tractors include Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and Los Alamos
Laboratory, both run by the University of California; Sandia Labora-
tory, a subsidiary of American Telephone and Telegraph; and Reyn-
olds Electrical and Engineering Company.5 The government and the
contractors early recognized that the contractors might be sued for
their actions during the testing program. They therefore entered into
indemnification contracts under which the United States would reim-
burse the contractors for any attorneys' fees and any judgments
against them in suits arising out of the atomic weapons testing.6
Beginning in the early 1980s, a number of lawsuits were filed against
these private contractors. Rather than defend the suits on the mer-
its-by arguing, for example, that they had acted properly given what
was known about radiation at the time of the tests, or that the illness
and death had not been caused by radiation-the contractors, assisted
by the Reagan Administration, sought help from the Congress.7
Their first attempt was rebuffed when, after hearings, a subcommittee
of the House Judiciary Committee found that the statute they sought
would be unconstitutional. The next year, Senator Warner of Vir-
ginia, at the request of the administration, introduced the statute as a
rider to the defense appropriation bill. It passed without hearing or
publicity, and was signed into law by President Reagan in 1984.
2. H. BALL, JUSTICE DOWNWIND: AMERICA'S ATOMIC TESTING PROGRAM IN THE 1950s,
at 59 (1986).
3. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
4. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) (West 1965).
5. In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 616 F.Supp. 759, 761 n.3
(N.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 1076 (1988);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Konizeski v. Livermore Labs, 108 S. Ct. 1076 (1988) (No. 87-
953)(cert. denied).
6. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Konizeski, 108 S. Ct. 1076.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 100-115.
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The statute, commonly called the "Warner Amendment," allowed
the United States government to be substituted as a defendant, in place
of the private contractors, in pending suits arising out of the atomic
weapons testing program. Once the government replaced the contrac-
tors, it asserted its sovereign immunity defenses and obtained dismissal
of the suits. The Warner Amendment thus short-circuited the pend-
ing suits and retroactively immunized the contractors from the conse-
quences of their conduct. Two federal Circuit Courts have held that
the Warner Amendment is constitutional,8 and the Supreme Court has
denied certiorari in the one case in which it was sought.9 Several
attempts have been made to repeal the Warner Amendment.10 None
has yet been successful.
In the materials that follow, I allow several of the victims to speak
for themselves in telling the stories of what happened to them. I also
tell in detail the story that led to the adoption of the Warner Amend-
ment. My ultimate conclusion is a legal one-that Congress violated
the separation of powers in passing the amendment. But a proper
understanding of the Warner Amendment, and the reasons why it vio-
lates the separation of powers, cannot be separated from the tales of
those who have been injured or killed by the atomic weapons, from the
motivations of the contractors and the government who today refuse
to acknowledge either the extent of the victims' injuries or their role in
causing those injuries, and from the manner in which Congress has
sought to protect the contractors and the government.
I. THE TESTING
In 1946, two bombs were exploded in the Marshall Islands in the
South Pacific, in a massive military exercise called, aptly, "Operation
Crossroads."' 1 Thousands of servicemen were exposed to radiation
from fallout from the explosions themselves and from exposure to the
water, ships, and beaches that were made radioactive by the explo-
8. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982; Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8 (1st Cir.
1986).
9. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982.
10. Hearings have been held on four separate occasions on proposals to repeal or modify the
Warner Amendment. Litigation Relating to Atomic Testing: Hearings on H.R. 1338 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Oversight on Issues Pertaining to Veterans'
Exposure to Ionizing Radiation: Hearings Before the Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, Senate, 99th
ong., 1st Sess. (1985); Government Liability for Atomic Weapons Testing Program: Hearing
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, Senate, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Hearing on S. 982 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 3, 1989) (publication pending).
11. D. BRADLEY, No PLACE TO HIDE (1948).
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sions. Testing thousands of miles from the continental United States
was difficult and expensive, however, and after three more Pacific
tests,12 the government brought the tests closer to home. Beginning in
1951, most atmospheric tests of atomic bombs were conducted in the
desert northwest of Las Vegas, at what has come to be known as the
Nevada Test Site. Between January, 1951, and August, 1963, there
were 201 "announced" tests at the Nevada test site.' 3 Testing contin-
ued offshore as well. Between April, 1951, and November, 1962, there
were a total of 99 "announced" tests in the Pacific, and three more in
the Atlantic.14
A. The Soldiers
At a number of these tests, both in the Pacific and in Nevada,
American soldiers were deliberately exposed to radiation. It is not fea-
sible to give an exhaustive account of the testing, partly because of the
scope of the narrative task i" and partly because governmental secrecy
has so far kept much of the information out of the public domain. A
sampling of the testimony of the soldiers that is now available, how-
ever, conveys much of what they went through.
Lieutenant Colonel James Dennis, a highly decorated veteran,1 6
recounted,
On March 22, 1955 ... I participated in Atomic Test Shot BEE, the
detonation of a new type atomic bomb emplaced on a 500 foot tower.
Three hundred other Army personnel and I were seated backs to the
blast in a hip deep trench 3500 yards from the atomic explosion....
With eyes closed as told, on detonation of the atomic bomb, I saw the
brightest light of my life from the nuclear fireball. We were told to
stand immediately, turn around and observe the atomic cloud. As we
turned we were hit in the face by radioactive fallout as the wind had
shifted, covering us all with a thick, black, sooty radioactive dust....
When I looked at the atomic cloud, I knew that a faulty detonation had
12. Low-Level Radiation Effects on Health: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1979) (testimony of Gen. Mahlon Gates, Manager, Nevada Operations
Office, Department of Energy).
13. Id. at 56.
14. Id. at 112-122.
15. Full-length books devoted to the atomic veterans include H. ROSENBERG, ATOMIC
SOLDIERS: AMERICAN VICTIMS OF NUCLEAR EXPERIMENTS (1980); T. SAFFER & 0. KELLY,
COUNTDOWN ZERO (1982); M. UHL & T. ENSIGN, GI GUINEA PIGS (1980).
16. Col. Dennis was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross twice, the Silver Star five times,
and the Purple Heart four times. Oversight on Issues Pertaining to Veterans' Exposure to Ionizing
Radiation, supra note 10, at 28 (testimony of Lt. Colonel James A. Dennis).
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occurred.... [T]he BEE shot was one of the most radioactive dirty
atomic detonations of all US atomic tests.
Thirty minutes after the atomic detonation, I and the other 300 per-
sonnel walked to 700 yards from ground zero where we assessed equip-
ment damage for three hours.[17 ] No Nevada test personnel were
present to prevent our going to ground zero.... Neither I nor any of
the other 300 personnel were equipped with film badges to measure pen-
etrating gama [sic] radiation. No one was measuring gama [sic] radia-
tion with a Geiger counter. More importantly, no one was measuring
the alpha and beta radiation levels which are the most lethal internal
radiation that is inhaled into the nose and ingested into the mouth.. ,. I
had to wear these same clothes the next day while participating in
atomic shot ESS on March 23, 1955. Moreover, we were unable to take
showers because shower facilities at Camp Desert Rock had been
destroyed by windstorms.
On March 23, 1955 I participated in atomic test shot ESS, an atomic
bomb detonated 67 feet underground. I and 356 other personnel
observed the test... in the open, not in trenches, about 9000 yards from
ground zero.... As with the BEE atomic shot, the detonation contami-
nated us all with radioactive dusty fallout. Again we had no protective
clothing or equipment, especially respirators, nor was anyone equipped
with film badges. No Desert Rock personnel monitored either penetrat-
ing gama [sic] radiation or alpha/beta emitter internal radiation. Again,
shower facilities were not available at Camp Desert Rock after our three
hour return bus trip.
18
Marine Second Lieutenant Thomas Saffer participated in two tests
in Nevada in 1957, "Priscilla" and "Hood." For "Priscilla," Saffer
was positioned with his men in open trenches about two miles from
the explosion of a bomb suspended beneath a balloon.
I felt an intense heat on the back of my neck. A brilliant flash accompa-
nied the heat, and I was shocked when, with my eyes tightly closed, I
could see the bones in my forearm as though I were examining a red x-
ray.[19] . . . Within seconds, a thunderous rumble like the sound of
17. Col. Dennis' estimate of 700 yards in his congressional testimony was based on official
government figures. He later indicated that he had gone directly to ground zero. "According to
the official Defense Nuclear Agency record, we marched to 700 yards from ground zero and
inspected equipment. But I walked directly to ground zero and everyone else did too. The
troops were not afraid. Like me, they felt we were being cared for properly. We trusted them."
Quoted in J. LERAGER, IN THE SHADOW OF THE CLOUD 92 (1988) (footnote added).
18. Oversight on Issues Pertaining to Veterans' Exposure to Ionizing Radiation, supra note 10,
at 28-30.
19. The soldiers' ability to see their bones is almost certainly due to the intensity of the visible
light, which penetrated and made translucent the ordinarily opaque soft tissue of the hands and
arms. Colonel Darrell W. McIndoe, M.D., Director of the Armed Forces Radiobiology
Research Institute of the National Naval Medical Center, testified in 1978, "I have no doubt that
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thousands of stampeding cattle passed directly overhead, pounding the
trench line. . . . The earth began to gyrate violently, and I could not
control my body. I was thrown repeatedly from side to side and
bounced helplessly off one trench wall and then off the other ...
Within minutes, the brilliant, sunlit day became gray-black.... A col-
umn of dark, powdery dust from the vicinity of ground zero had been
sucked up several hundred feet by the force of the blast.... I glanced at
my right sleeve and noticed a white-gray ash about the size of a small
button .... The ash continued to fall, and we had nowhere to go for
shelter ....
By the time we boarded the armored personnel carriers, our green
utilities looked as though they had been splattered with beige paint....
We were to inspect the equipment that had been placed in front of us,
three hundred yards from ground zero. After an extremely rough ride,
we stopped .... Where trucks and tanks had stood before the detona-
tion, there was nothing. Everything had been vaporized or tossed hun-
dreds of yards from its original position. . . . The ground felt hot
beneath my feet.
[An Atomic Energy Commission field man] had driven seven miles
from his position to near ground zero.., to recover an instrument....
[H]e was attired in special radex protective clothing. All his skin was
covered, and he was wearing a hooded respirator.... He planned to
retrieve the instrument, place it in a lead box, and leave the area within
three minutes .... To his surprise, he saw a group of marines, dressed
as though they were taking a casual stroll in the desert, standing in the
contaminated area ....
Standing there with the other marine officers, dumfounded by what I
was seeing, I became aware of a figure in white approaching us from the
left. . . . Without uttering a word, he gestured for us to leave at
once .... Finally, our major said, "All right, men, let's go. We've seen
enough."
20
Marine Sergeant Israel Torres recounted his participation in the
"Hood" test.
[T]here was a big, loud blast and a very bright light appeared.... My
trench began to cave in, and I got scared .... I tried to avoid getting
buried, and I had moved about a foot when.., suddenly I was buried
up to my chest .... A strong wind hit me in the face and knocked me
backward, even though I was partly buried. My head snapped back,
they did see their bones, but that would be because of the light, not X-ray." Volume I-Effect of
Radiation on Human Health, Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 325 (1978) (testimony of Dr. Darrell W. Mclndoe)
(footnote added).
20. T. SAFFER & 0. KELLY, supra note 15, at 43-51.
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and my helmet went flying off behind me .... I managed to free my
arms, and using both hands I wiped away the thick layer of dust and
dirt that covered my face and eyes and looked down.... I shook all
over and began to vomit ....
My platoon had been delayed in its mission, and we had to conduct
our field exercise. We began to sweep the area. As we approached
ground zero, I saw tanks melted down, and. other heavy equipment
burned to cinders. We continued sweeping for about two hours....
Later we were force marched to a place where trucks were waiting for
us. Before boarding the vehicles, we were checked with some type of an
instrument that I think was a Geiger counter. When I was checked, the
thing ticked loudly, and the man who monitored me told me something
that I have never forgotten. He said, "Marine, you have had it. You get
in that truck over there with the other men." Before I got in the truck,
my [film] badge was taken away by a young lieutenant.2 '
[I saw] something else horrible... out there in the desert after we'd
been decontaminated and were in our trucks. We'd only gone a short
way when one of my men said, "Jesus Christ, look at that!" I looked at
where he was pointing, and what I saw horrified me. There were people
in a stockade - a chain-link fence with barbed wire on top of it....
Their hair was falling out and their skin seemed to be peeling off. They
were wearing blue denim trousers but no shirts. When we passed those
people-there were ten or twelve-they tried to cover their faces with
their hands.... Good God, it was scary.
While I was in the hospital I told my nurse what I'd seen .... The
next day when [the doctor] looked in on me, he said, "The nurse told me
a most unusual story. What about those people you say you saw at the
test site in Nevada?".. . [Torres was questioned on two occasions dur-
ing the next two days. He thought that one of the questioners was a
psychiatrist.]
A couple of nights later they woke me up and gave me a pill to "help
you rest more comfortably." The next morning they took me to the
Balboa Naval Hospital in San Diego [where four men questioned him at
length].... I told the story of the people behind the chain-link fence
again. They told me I imagined I saw those people. I said I was telling
the truth, and offered to take a lie detector test .... One of them called
me a liar and forced a large pill down my throat .... I must have been
kept drugged for days, because I woke up back at Camp Pendleton in
the hospital. The day I left to return to my unit a doctor told me not to
repeat the "bizarre" story about the people I'd seen. He said if I did,
he'd see to it I was thrown out of the corps.22
21. Id. at 76-78.
22. Id. at 248-250.
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Many atomic veterans and their children have suffered serious
health problems.23 Lieutenant Saffer later suffered severe neuromus-
cular disorders of the type common to many atomic veterans. 24 In the
years immediately following the test, Sergeant Torres suffered from
dizziness, double vision, severe headaches, muscles spasms, and back
problems. He was given a medical discharge from the Marine Corps
in 1963, six years after his participation in "Hood."' 2- Torres was
diagnosed as having leukemia in 1980.26
Dale Beaman was a boiler tender who converted salt to fresh water
before and after the tests at Bikini Atoll during Operation Crossroads.
He has had colon cancer, kidney surgery, migratory muscle spasms,
musculoskeletal deterioration, and suffers from diabetes and hyperten-
sive heart disease. "I don't recall feeling tired when I went in the ser-
vice, but I've been tired ever since I was eighteen. I've had a lot of
pain over the years and I just took it. I've suffered terrible." Mr.
Beaman's son has severe musculoskeletal and connective tissue abnor-
malities, and is mentally retarded. His daughters have congenital joint
abnormalities.27
Pat Hinkle served on a seagoing tugboat that towed targets to
Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls in 1956. After each explosion, his boat
went to ground zero to take depth soundings. He was exposed to sev-
enteen explosions during a four month period. In 1974, he was diag-
nosed as having cancer. He survived three operations, and died of an
inoperable brain tumor in 1981. Mr. Hinkle had three daughters. All
have had spinal alignment problems. One was born without a left
hand.28
B. The Civilians
The area downwind of the Nevada Test Site is dotted with ranches
and small towns, particularly in the southwest corner of Utah where
23. At the time of his testimony before Congress in 1985, Colonel Dennis was suffering from
cancer. He was blind in his right eye as a result of bleeding caused by the cancer. Oversight on
Issues Pertaining to Veterans' Exposure to Ionizing Radiation, supra note 10, at 25-26. Dennis
had testified at a hearing on a proposal to repeal the Warner Amendment a month earlier. At
that hearing, the government conceded that Dennis had cancer, but denied that it was caused by
radiation. Litigation Relating to Atomic Testing, supra note 10, at 129 (testimony of Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Robert L. Willmore).
24. T. SAFFER & 0. KELLY, supra note 15, at 237-239.
25. Id. at 250-25 1.
26. At the time Sgt. Torres was interviewed for Countdown Zero, he was forty-six years old.
"He wore leg, arm, and back braces. He had lost most of his teeth, all of his hair, and his sight
was failing." T. SAFFER & 0. KELLY, supra note 15, at 245.
27. J. LERAGER, supra note 17, at 12.
28. Id. at 16.
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the land is less arid than in Nevada. As with the soldiers, it is not
possible to give an exhaustive account of the impact of the testing on
the civilian population, now commonly called the "downwinders."
Two stories give a sense of what happened.
Shot Harry exploded early in the morning of May 19, 1953. Wind
conditions carried a cloud containing large amounts of fallout over the
towns of southwest Utah. A Public Health Service "offsite moni-
tor,"2 9 Frank Butrico, took radiation readings between 9:15 and 9:30
a.m. in the center of St. George, Utah. The readings were "offscale,"
and he telephoned his superior, William Johnson, back at the test site
for instructions. Johnson told Butrico to wait. Butrico again called
Johnson for instructions at 9:45.30 Johnson instructed Butrico to warn
the residents to stay indoors, but neither man knew if St. George had a
radio station.31 Butrico found the mayor of St. George, who called the
nearest radio station in Cedar City, fifty miles to the north. At about
10:15 a.m., the station broadcast a warning to St. George residents to
stay indoors. The warning was not addressed to other towns east of
St. George. Butrico and a police officer cruised up and down a few
streets and warned people they found outdoors. They drove past
school children playing outdoors at recess. A significant number of
people never received any warning. 32
On the advice of Johnson, Butrico bought new clothing in St.
George and discarded his old clothing. He took "a number" of show-
ers that afternoon and shampooed his hair repeatedly. 33 No instruc-
tion was ever given to the residents of St. George that they should
decontaminate themselves by changing clothes or showering. Butrico
was instructed to give only vague statements about the amount of fall-
out.3 4 When asked, he responded that radioactivity was "a little above
normal [but] not in the range of being harmful. ' 35 Activity in St.
George returned to normal by the early afternoon. 6
Butrico later prepared a report for Johnson concerning the public
health measures taken after Shot Harry. The report did not survive in
29. H. BALL, supra note 2, at 152.
30. Allen v. United States, 588 F.Supp. 247, at 390 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417
(10th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988); P. FRADKIN, FALLOUT: AN AMERICAN
NUCLEAR TRAGEDY 13 (1989) (gives the times as 9:15 for when Butrico first called Johnson, and
9:30 when he called him again).
31. Allen, 588 F.Supp. at 391; P. FRADKIN, supra note 30, at 13-14.
32. P. FRADKIN, supra note 30, at 15.
33. Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 391.
34. H. BALL, supra note 2, at 43-44; P. FRADKIN, supra note 30, at 18.
35. H. BALL, supra note 2, at 43-44.
36. Allen, 588 F.Supp. at 391.
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the form written by Butrico. Unidentified Atomic Energy Commis-
sion staff employees lowered Butrico's reported radiation readings and
changed the amount of time that elapsed before St. George officials
and school principals were notified.37 The revised report claimed,
falsely, that school children were indoors when the fallout cloud
passed over St. George.38 The report concluded, in words not written
by Butrico, that the "effectiveness of the safety program was
amazing."'3 9
The population in southern Nevada and southwestern Utah is
predominantly Mormon. As a matter of religious conviction they do
not smoke, drink alcohol, or drink coffee. Up until the atomic testing,
they generally lived remarkably long and healthy lives. After the test-
ing, many began to die of radiation-induced diseases, primarily can-
cer." In testimony before Congress in 1982, Gloria Gregerson
recounted what happened to the small town of Bunkerville, Nevada.
In an informal survey of my town, I located 4 families in about 50, who
did not have some type of cancer in their family. One family had seven
different people in their family with cancer, and had over a dozen mis-
carriages.... [W]e hardly ever heard of cancer before the testing began
but, soon after, these types of cancer became commonplace to us.4 '
Mrs. Gregerson recalled her own experiences:
I remember the day the nuclear testing started in Nevada. [I was ten
years old.]42 The first blast came without any warning. We were awak-
ened out of a sound sleep .... We lived in an old two-story home. It
broke out several of our windows and cracked our house on two sides
the full length of the house .... After this my parents would not let us
stay in the house. They took us, still in our pajamas, to the top of a hill
where we would watch the blast from there. We could see the flash
immediately, and a few minutes later the rumble would come up the
37. H. BALL, supra note 2, at 44.
38. Id. at 153.
39. Id. at 44.
40. For example, according to a 1979 study, childhood leukemia in high-fallout areas of
southern Utah occurred at a rate 2.44 times higher than the normal Utah childhood leukemia
rate. Lyon, Klauber, Gardner & Udall, Childhood Leukemia Associated with Fallout from
Nuclear Testing, 300 NEW ENGLAND J. OF MEDICINE No. 8 (1979); see also Volume I, Health
Effects of Low-Level Radiation, supra note 19, at 355-361 (testimony of Dr. Joseph Lyn). The
District Court in Allen, 588 F. Supp. 429-447, found that ten of twenty-four "bellwether"
plaintiffs had suffered radiation-induced cancers. See infra text accompanying notes 88-95.
41. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1981-Part 2: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, Senate, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1982) (testimony of Gloria
Gregerson).
42. Id. at 20.
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river and bounce back and forth between the different mountain
ranges....
The radioactive cloud, as it came over, was really distinct. It would
usually come over our school campus between 9 and 10 in the morn-
ing.... Later the Government officials would come to our school to
talk to us in assemblies, but they never came until after several blasts
had already been shot off... They would preface their remarks saying:
"There is nothing to be alarmed about. There is nothing to hurt you, so
don't worry, but wash your cars every day; wash your clothes twice
before you wear them; don't eat the plants and the vegetables; be sure
you wash everything off with water before you even walk on it; don't
drink the local milk," yet that is the only way we had to get milk,
through our cows. They just kept emphasizing one point, and that was:
"Nothing to worry about. There is no danger."...
I remember playing under the oleander trees.... and the fallout was
so thick it was like snow.... [W]e liked to play under the trees and
shake this fallout onto our heads and our bodies, thinking that we were
playing in the snow. I r~member writing my name on the car because
the fallout dust was so thick.... Then I would go home and eat. If my
mother caught me as a young child, I would wash my hands; if not, then
I would eat with the fallout on my hands....
I don't recall ever being sick in elementary school .... However,
within a few months after the testing started I did become ill. I began to
suffer spells of nausea and headaches all the time.... By the time I was
17 1 had ovarian cancer, which spread to the intestines and stomach and
involved 13 major surgeries. Needless to say, this meant I would never
be able to bear children. Having a family was and still is the most
important factor in my life. My husband and I have adopted five chil-
dren.... In 1970 I was diagnosed as having squamous cell carcinoma
in the vagina and had more surgery .... [In January, 1980] I was hospi-
talized and later diagnosed as having... acute myelomonocytic leuke-
mia and given 3 weeks to live. It was horrifying to suddenly have all of
my hair gone and my face nothing but big blistering sores. My skin
would tear if I moved wrong. I was confined to the hospital for 4 solid
months. My temperature would keep going [up] ... [and] I got frostbite
from the ice blankets that were used to keep my fever down.... I am in
remission right now [April 8, 1982], but lately I have had more
problems and I am scheduled for a bone marrow transplant on April27. 4 3
Mrs. Gregerson died of cancer the next year, at age 42.4
43. Id. at 22-24.
44. H. BALL, supra note 2, at 92.
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II. THE WARNER AMENDMENT
The government strenuously resisted providing compensation to
veterans and civilians exposed to radiation during the atomic bomb
testing. Possible avenues of redress against the government were few.
Veterans could seek statutory benefits from the Veterans' Administra-
tion on the ground that their illness and injury was service-related, but
until a very recent statutory enactment, atomic veterans' claims were
almost invariably denied. Even when they were granted, the statutory
schedule of benefits provided far less than full compensation for the
injuries they had suffered. Veterans could seek compensation for the
full amount of their injuries under the Federal Tort Claims Act, not
limited to the statutory benefits provided by the Veterans' Administra-
tion, but the sovereign immunity of the government turned out to be
an insuperable obstacle. Civilians could seek compensation from the
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, but sovereign immu-
nity has similarly proved to be an insuperable obstacle. Redress
against the contractors was more easily available, however, because
the contractors did not share the sovereign immunity of the govern-
ment, and suits against the contractors held out significant promise
until defeated by the Warner Amendment.
A. Redress Against the Government
1. Veterans' Benefits
Attempts by veterans to obtain benefits from the Veterans' Admin-
istration on the ground that their injuries were service-related were,
during the period leading up the passage of the Warner Amendment,
almost entirely unavailing.45 Claims for veterans' benefits were heard
in an administrative proceeding, with no judicial review of a decision
of the Veterans' Administration.46 The veteran could present testi-
mony from those who appear voluntarily, but had no power to sub-
45. The administrative procedure in veterans' claims proceedings has since been modified in
some respects by the Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988)
(codified in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1989)). In addition, the Radiation-
Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-321, 102 Stat. 485 (codified at 38
U.S.C.A. § 312(c) (West Supp. 1989)) establishes a legal presumption that certain types of cancer
have been caused by radiation for purposes of proving service-related injury. The Act provides
benefits in accordance with a statutory schedule that falls short of providing full compensation,
and excludes certain diseases from its presumption. Pat Broudy, the widow of an atomic veteran
and litigant in Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981), described the benefits
provided by the Act as a "drop in the bucket." Comment, The Bomb Can Do No Wrong: From
Blackstonean Misconception to the Technological God, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 583, 655 n.415
(1988-1989) [hereinafter Comment, The Bomb Can Do No Wrong].
46. 38 U.S.C.A. § 21 l(a) (West 1979), amended by 38 U.S.C.A. § 211(a) (West Supp. 1989).
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poena witnesses.47 The Veterans' Administration had the power to
subpoena documents that would assist a veteran in making a claim,"
but rarely exercised it.49 Attorneys were prohibited, by a criminal
statute, from charging more than $10.00 for assisting a veteran in
seeking benefits from the Veterans' Administration.50
Veterans' Administration claims hearings are, in theory, informal
and solicitous of the veteran.51 In practice, for the atomic veterans,
they were complex52 and hostile. A new statute providing benefits for
atomic veterans has just been passed, 3 but until its passage atomic
veterans' claims were routinely denied. Figures available in 1982 indi-
cated that approximately 1800 claims for benefits had been filed by
atomic veterans. 4 Twelve had been granted. 5 Behind those few cases
in which benefits were granted lie stories of bureaucratic tangles and
political pressures that should have no place in a well-run administra-
tive system.
The case of Orville Kelly is the most well-known of those in which
benefits were granted. Kelly was first denied benefits in August,
1974.56 He was denied again in June, 1978.17 He was denied a third
time in April, 1979.58 Finally, in November, 1979, the Board of Veter-
47. 38 C.F.R. § 19.165 (1983); see National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F.
Supp. 1302, 1319 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (describing procedures in
Veterans' Administrative hearings).
48. 38 U.S.C.A. § 3311 (West 1979).
49. Between 1979 and 1984, the Veterans' Administration issued only five subpoenas, and
"some of these may have been issued in an attempt to disprove rather than help support a claim."
Waiters, 589 F. Supp. at 1321.
50. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 3404-3405 (West 1979) (amended at 38 U.S.C.A. § 3404 (West Supp.
1989)). The $10.00 fee limitation was changed by the Veterans' Judicial Review Act, supra note
45. Under the new provisions, codified at 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c)(l)-(d)(1) (West Supp. 1989), no
fee can be charged for services performed before the Board of Veterans' Appeals first makes a
final decision in the case; attorneys' fees may be charged for services performed thereafter, but
limited to no more than 20% of the amount of "past-due benefits awarded."
51. Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 311 (1985) ("The process is
designed to function throughout with a high degree of informality and solicitude for the
claimant.").
52. "The undisputed factual evidence submitted by the plaintiffs in this case shows that both
the procedures and the substance entailed in presenting [Service-Connected Death and
Disability] claims to the [Veterans' Administration] are exceedingly complex." Walters, 589 F.
Supp. at 1319.
53. Radiation-Exposed Veterans' Compensation Act of 1988, supra note 45.
54. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1981-Part 2, supra note 41, at 35 (testimony of
Pat Broudy).
55. Id. at 30-34 (Memorandum prepared by the Veterans' Administration, put into the record
by Senator Orrin Hatch).
56. T. SAFFER & 0. KELLY, supra note 15, at 146.
57. Id. at 170.
58. Id. at 182.
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ans' Appeals reversed the denial.5 9 Behind this bare narrative, how-
ever, lie years of bureaucratic maneuvering and political pressure,
60
including full-scale congressional hearings on the difficulties facing
atomic veterans making claims before the Veterans' Administration.6 '
Kelly died in June, 1980. After his death, his widow received statu-
tory benefits that fell far short of full compensation for the injuries
suffered. As of 1982, those benefits amounted to $562 per month for
"dependency and indemnity compensation"; his child received $342
per month "to pursue an undergraduate degree.",
62
2. Suits Against the Government
a. Veterans
Suits against the government to obtain full compensation have been
uniformly unsuccessful because of the sovereign immunity-based doc-
trine of Feres v. United States,63 under which all damage claims
against the United States or its officers for compensation for injuries
suffered by active duty servicemen are barred. For example, in Jaffee
v. United States, 64 plaintiff Jaffee and other soldiers
were ordered by their commanding officers to stand in a field [in a 1953
test] without benefit of any protection while a nuclear device was
exploded a short distance away. Even though the defendants allegedly
knew they were exposing Jaffee and the other soldiers to grave risk of
injury and death, they "knowingly, deliberately and recklessly disre-
garded this knowledge by compelling Jaffee and the other soldiers to
participate in the test." . As a result of this exposure to radiation,
Jaffee developed inoperable cancer.65
Even while recognizing "what some might call a harsh result in our
holding,"66 the Court of Appeals held that Feres barred any damage
59. Id. at 198.
60. Id. at 177-196.
61. Veterans' Claims for Disabilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, Senate, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Kelly's testimony was read
into the record at the hearing by Mr. 0. T. Weeks, id. at 6-9, because he was hospitalized.
62. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1981-Part 2, supra note 41, at 31
(Memorandum prepared by the Veterans' Administration). The case is identified in the
Veterans' Administration memorandum only as "CASE 2."
63. 340 U.S. 135 (1950); see also United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (reaffirming
Feres); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987) (reaffirming Feres).
64. 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981)(en bane), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982).
65. 663 F.2d at 1229. The Court of Appeals assumed for purposes of its ruling that the
allegations were true.
66. Id. at 1228.
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recovery. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.6 7 Other cases have
produced the same result.68
The strength of the sovereign immunity-based bar protecting the
government from damage judgments is not limited to what the govern-
ment did, and did not do, during a soldier's tour of duty. It extends,
as well, to acts and omissions of the government after a soldier has
been discharged from service. In Broudy v. United States6 9 the Ninth
Circuit in 1981 held that Feres did not protect the government from a
claim for damages resulting from a post-discharge failure to warn an
exposed veteran of the risk that he might develop cancer, and that a
cause of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act7 ° was available in a
case where the government failed to provide reasonable post-discharge
warning.71 But what the Ninth Circuit gave with one hand, it took
away with the other. Four years later, it held that the "discretionary
function" exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act 72 protected the
government's failure to warn.73
b. Civilians
Civilians have been equally unsuccessful in obtaining compensation
from the government. Two cases illustrate the difficulties civilian
plaintiffs have faced. The first was a damage suit for the loss of sheep.
During the spring and early summer of 1953, a series of eleven atmos-
pheric explosions called "Upshot-Knothole" was conducted at the
Nevada Test Site. At the time of the explosions, 11,710 sheep were
67. 456 U.S. 972 (1982).
68. See, eg., Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that Feres
does not bar suit for damages brought by wife and son for miscarriages and chromosomal
damage), rev'd, 715 F.2d 96, 97 (3d Cir. 1983) ("We are forced once again to decide a case where
'we sense the injustice... of [the] result' but where nevertheless we have no legal authority, as an
intermediate appellate court, to decide the cases differently."), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984);
Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (veteran, spouse, and children barred
from suing for exposure while on active duty and for failure to warn after discharge), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1118 (1983); Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 134 (9th Cir. 1981) ("If
developed doctrine did not bind us we might be inclined to make an exception in a case such as
this. Unfortunately, we are bound .... "), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982); Kelly v. United
States, 512 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (veteran barred from suing for exposure while on active
duty); Fountain v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Ark. 1981) (veteran and spouse barred
from suing); Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318, 325 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (surviving spouse
barred from suing except on post-discharge failure to warn).
69. 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981).
70. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (West 1976 & Supp. 1989).
71. 661 F.2d at 128-129.
72. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) (West 1976).
73. In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982, 999 (9th Cir.
1987) (Broudy was one of the consolidated cases), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1076 (1988).
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grazing in an area north and east of the test site. Of these sheep, 1,420
(or twelve percent) of the lambing ewes, and 2,970 (or twenty five
percent) of the new lambs died.74
At hearings before Congress in 1979, Mr. Kern Bulloch, one of the
sheepherders, described his experience:
We were on the trail home from our Nevada range.... [The sheep] were
grazing, and these airplanes came over.... [A]nd all at once this bomb
dropped.... And, of course, the cloud came up and drifted over us....
[I]t was a little bit later that day that some of the Army personnel that
had four-by-fours and jeeps ... came through there ... and they said,
"Boy, you guys are really in a hot spot. [You better get out of here]"...
Well, we had to herd the sheep. We had to move as fast as they walked
... and that's not very fast.... [W]e trailed into Cedar City [Utah]-I
guess it was 200 and some odd miles . . . and when we got into our
lambing yards... we started to los[e] the sheep.... [T]he lambs were
born with little legs, kind of pot-bellied. As I remember some of them
didn't have any wool, kind of skin instead of wool.... [W]e just started
to losing [sic] so many lambs that my father ... just about went crazy.
He had never seen anything like it before. Neither had I; neither had
anybody else.75
Dr. Stephen Brower, the Iron County Agricultural Agent living in
Cedar City, recounted:
[I] was present at the time the first AEC veterinarians and personnel
arrived.... [In February I wrote to the Governor of Utah] that the
AEC didn't ignore the data, they covered it up. There was a specific
policy....
The policy was stated to me originally by the... Chief of the Biologi-
cal Branch of the Division of Biological Medicine of the AEC, Dr. Paul
Pearson. Dr. Pearson told me ... that the AEC could under no circum-
stances afford to have a claim established against them and have that
precedent set.[7 6] . . . by the end of 1954 they had a battery of people
coming through telling us that the levels of radiation could not have
caused the damage....
• . . During the first month or two of the initial investigation, the
scientists who were there were ... saying and specifying this was radia-
74. Bulloch v. United States, 95 F.R.D. 123, 129 (D. Utah 1982), rev'd, 721 F.2d 713 (10th
Cir. 1983).
75. Volume I, Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation, supra note 19, at 227-28 (testimony of
Kern Bulloch).
76. P. FRADKIN, supra note 30, at 152, writes, "Brower's account of the conversation has
been given publicly four times since early 1979. Three of the times Brower was under oath.
Pearson later said in a sworn deposition that he had no recollection of the conversation, to which
Brower replied at the Allen trial, 'I'm not surprised.' "
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tion damage .... [these scientists] were not allowed to testify [in the
Bulloch case] ....
*.. They were taken off the case. In fact, Dr. Thompsett, who said he
would give me a copy of the report and provide a copy of his report to
the livestock men indicating the readings and the appearance of the ani-
mals definitely were similar to an experimental radiation damage done
on animals, told me later that his report was picked up-even his own
personal copy-and he was told to rewrite it and eliminate any reference
to speculation about radiation damage or effects."
Six sheep owners, including Bulloch, filed suit in federal District
Court in Utah against the government for damages in 1955.71 The
District Judge found that recovery was not barred by the discretionary
function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act,79 and set the case
for trial. At trial, the government's witnesses denied that the death of
the sheep was due to radiation. The District Judge found plaintiffs'
account of the cause unpersuasive and held for the government. 80 So
things rested until 1979, when testimony before a joint congressional
committee brought out additional facts concerning radiation from
atomic testing and its effects, prompting the plaintiffs to make further
77. Volume I, Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation, supra note 19, at 232-233, 238
(testimony of Dr. Stephen Brower). For Dr. Brower's formal written memorandum to the same
effect, see id. at 234-237.
78. Bulloch v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885, 889 (D. Utah 1955). The story of the sheep
deaths, and the subsequent cover-up and litigation is told at length in P. FRADKIN, supra note 30,
and in J. FULLER, THE DAY WE BOMBED UTAH: AMERICA'S MOST LETHAL SECRET 1-5, 13-
29, 42-101, 117-65, 223-36, 240-52, 257-58 (1984).
79. Bulloch, 133 F. Supp. at 889.
80. 145 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D. Utah 1956) ("Of the three professional men who originally
suggested radiation damage, two, upon further consideration, questioned their original diagnosis.
None of them claimed to be particularly qualified in the field of radiation. On the other hand,
some of the best informed lexperts in the country expressed considered and convincing judgment
that radiation damage could not possibly have been a cause or contributing cause."), vacated, 95
F.R.D. 123 (D. Utah 1982), rev'd, 721 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1983).
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investigations into the sheep deaths."' In 1981, the plaintiffs moved to
vacate the earlier judgment for fraud on the court. 82
In August, 1982, the same District Judge filed a twenty-one page
opinion analyzing in detail the testimony given at the trial in the
1950s. He compared it to the facts now available about those same
events and vacated the earlier judgment.8" He concluded that "one or
more" of the government's attorneys
knowingly participated in a program for the concealment from the
Court of facts which he or they knew or in good conscience should have
known the Court was entitled to have placed before it in order properly
to rule upon the determinative issues of the case.84 . . . [I]t appears by
clear and convincing evidence . . . that representations made as the
result of the conduct of government agents acting in the course of their
employment were intentionally false or deceptive; that improper but
successful attempts to pressure witnesses not to testify as to their real
opinions, or to unduly discount their qualifications and opinions were
applied; that a vital report was intentionally withheld and information
in another report was presented in such a manner as to be deceitful,
misleading, or only half true; that interrogatories were deceptively
answered; that there was deliberate concealment of significant facts with
reference to the possible effects of radiation upon the plaintiffs' sheep
85
81. Volume I, Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation, supra note 19.
The committee report that resulted from the hearings is STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE AND SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., "THE FORGOTTEN GUINEA PIGS": A REPORT ON
HEALTH EFFECTS OF LoW-LEVEL RADIATION SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS TESTING PROGRAM CONDUCTED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (1980).
The report concluded:
[B]ecause the agency charged with developing nuclear weapons was more concerned with
that goal than with its other mission of protecting the public from injury, the government
totally failed to provide adequate protection for the residents of the area.... In addition, the
government's program for monitoring the health effects of the tests was inadequate and,
more disturbingly, all evidence suggesting that radiation was having harmful effects, be it on
the sheep or the people, was not only disregarded but actually suppressed.
The greatest irony of our atmospheric nuclear testing program is that the only victims of
U.S. nuclear arms since World War II have been our own people.
Id. at 37.
82. 95 F.R.D. at 131.
83. Bulloch v. United States, 95 F.R.D. 123 (D. Utah 1982).
84. Id. at 142.
85. Id. at 144.
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The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, over a strong
dissent. 6 The Supreme Court denied certiorari, over the dissents of
Justices White, Blackmun, and O'Connor.87
The second case was a class action damage suit brought by civilian
downwinders in federal District Court in Utah.88 The District Judge
wrote a two-hundred sixteen page opinion in which he held that the
discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act did
not provide immunity to the government.89 The decision of the gov-
ernment "to try to stabilize the restless balance of world power...
[by] open air atomic testing" was discretionary and protected.90 But
"[a]t the operational level employees of the United States had a duty
to prepare and conduct tests carefully with* full regard for public
safety,""1 and violations of the duty. of care were not protected by the
discretionary function exception. 92 The judge concluded that the gov-
ernment had violated its duty of care, for example, by failing to pro-
vide warning to the citizens of St. George on the morning of May 19,
1953.93 Finally, the judge analyzed twenty-four representative, or
"bellwether," cases drawn from the members of the class, and con-
cluded that ten of the twenty-four could establish sufficient causal rela-
tion between their illnesses and the radiation to which they had been
exposed.
94
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that
the government's actions were protected by the discretionary function
exception.95 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, with
no notation of dissent.96
86. 721 F.2d 713 (1983).
87. 474 U.S. 1086 (1986) (Chief Justice Burger did not participate). P. FRADKIN, supra note
30, at 159-161, indicates that Chief Justice Burger, while Deputy Attorney General in charge of
the Civil Division, was involved in decisions concerning the first litigation in Bulloch, 95 F.R.D
123.
88. Allen v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 476 (D. Utah 1981), later proceeding, 588 F. Supp.
247 (D. Utah 1984), rey'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 694 (1988).
89. 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108
S. Ct. 694 (1988).
90. 588 F. Supp. at 336.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 340.
93. For the description of the actions of Frank Butrico, see supra text accompanying notes
29-39. The story of Butrico's actions is publicly known only because the litigation in Allen was
permitted to go forward. It is told in summary form in Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 390-392; and is
recounted in greater detail in H. BALL, supra note 2, at 43-44, 152-153, and in P. FRADKIN,
supra note 30, at 10-18, 21-22, both of which rely on the trial transcript and depositions in the
case.
94. 588 F. Supp. at 429-447.
95. 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987).
96. 108 S. Ct 694 (1988).
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B. Redress Against Contractors: The Warner Amendment
The combination of the government's sovereign immunity and its
aggressive and disingenuous public relations and litigation strategies
made full compensation from the government unattainable. The con-
tractors of the government stood on a different footing, however, for
the sovereign immunity bar of Feres and the "discretionary function"
exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act did not protect the contrac-
tors. They were protected by the "government contractors defense,"
which shields contractors from liability when they act at the specific
direction of the government,97 but this protection is narrower than the
Feres and discretionary function defenses.
During the early 1980s, a number of atomic veterans and civilians
filed state law tort suits, primarily in California,98 against the contrac-
tors. The government and the contractors had long anticipated the
possibility of such suits. In the 1940s, when atomic weapons develop-
ment and testing began, the United States signed indemnification con-
tracts with all the contractors. Recognizing that the nature of the
work entailed risk of injury and death, and consequent risk of suits
against the contractors, the United States agreed to indemnify the con-
tractors for all attorneys' fees and for any judgments that might be
recovered in suits arising out of the atomic weapons program. Those
contracts were in force in the early 1980s, and are still in force today. 99
The contractors were unwilling to trust the ordinary processes of
litigation in these suits. The government contractors' defense, the
defense that they acted in the exercise of due care given the state of
knowledge at the time, and the defense that the injuries of the veterans
were not fairly traceable to the radiation to which they were exposed,
were all available to the contractors. But the contractors sought to
avoid litigation altogether. They went to Congress seeking a statute
97. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2518 (1988)(government
contractor immune from suit for design defect in equipment supplied to the government when
"(I) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed
to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use
of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States").
98. In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 616 F. Supp. 759 (N.D.
Cal. 1985), aff'd sub. nom., Konizeski v. Livermore Labs, 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988). Of the twenty-nine individuals exposed to radiation, twenty-four
were in the armed forces at the time of the exposure, four were civilians, and one was a
serviceman for three test series and a civilian for a fourth. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4-5,
Konizeski v. Livermore Labs, 108 S. Ct. 1076 (1988) (No. 87-953) (cert. denied). Other suits
were filed in Massachusetts, see Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8 (lst Cir. 1986) (single
plaintiff), and Nevada, see Prescott v. United States, No. 80-143 (D. Nev. dismissed September
19, 1985) (consolidated cases).
99. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Konizeski 108 S. Ct. 1076.
304
Vol. 65:285, 1990
Atomic Bomb Testing
that would retroactively immunize them from their conduct, short-
circuiting the lawsuits without reaching the merits.
The contractors proposed an amendment to a Department of
Energy bill that would have characterized a contractor involved in
"atomic defense national defense activities" as an "instrumentality" of
the federal government, with the anticipated consequence that the
contractors, once so characterized, could assert the government's sov-
ereign immunity defenses that were otherwise unavailable to them."°°
The proposed amendment was referred to the Subcommittee on
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Judici-
ary Committee, which then held hearings. 1 Representatives from
the Justice Department and the Department of Energy appeared in
support of the contractors, and proposed a substitute bill that, instead
of characterizing the contractors as "instrumentalities" of the govern-
ment, would permit the government to be substituted in place of the
contractors in any litigation arising out of the atomic weapons testing
program. 102
There is no question that the proposals of the contractors and the
government were motivated by the pending suits that had been filed by
the atomic veterans and civilians, in which the contractors were
unwilling to trust their fate to the defenses available to them. Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Bernard Vance testified to the House
Subcommittee:
The purpose of this [proposed] section is to substitute the United States
as the sole party in suits alleging damages arising from radiation expo-
sure in the U. S. testing of atomic weapons. At present, there is wide-
spread litigation against independent contractors or contractors who
worked closely with the United States in carrying out its atomic weap-
ons testing program. 103
Theodore Garfish, General Counsel for the Department of Energy,
was equally clear in his testimony:
Several of these contractors have become involved in extensive litigation
in which Plaintiffs are alleging specifically that radioactive fallout from
the United States' testing of nuclear devices in the Pacific and in the
100. HOUSE COMM. ON THE ARMED SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL
SECURITY AND MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AUTHORIZATIONS ACT OF
1984, H.R. REP. No. 124, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 1-2, 27-30 (1983) [hereinafter HOUSE
COMM. ADVERSE REPORT].
101. Litigation Relating to Atomic Testing, supra note 10.
102. Id. at 20, 33-38 (testimony and statement of Bernard W. Vance), 40-41 (statement of
Theodore Garrish).
103. Id. at 20 (testimony of Bernard W. Vance).
Washington Law Review
continental United States caused cancer and other injuries. . . . The
Department of Energy would welcome a remedy to this circumstance
that would alleviate the burden on these government contractors to
defend the atomic weapons testing program and decisions.'
°4
There is also no question that the purpose of the proposed amendment
was to obtain dismissals in the pending suits. Attorney General
Vance, in his testimony before the Subcommittee, tried to make this
consequence inconspicuous, but in the end he was forced to admit it
openly:
[Representative] Hall. Doesn't sovereign immunity bar claims of this
type brought against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act? Doesn't the Feres doctrine preclude suits by active military per-
sonnel, and the discretionary function exemption and the other excep-
tions in 28 U.S.C. 2680 would preclude many if not all of the other
claims; is that not correct?
Mr. Vance. The defenses under the Federal Tort Claims Act, as we
envision it, would stay in place, and if the Feres doctrine would apply to
particular plaintiffs, we believe it would apply here; yes. 105
[Representative] Frank. Now the effect then of the amendment
you're presenting would be for us to go into pending cases and say to
plaintiffs who may have a case 'you no longer have a case, you're out of
court[']; is that correct?
Mr. Vance. If the Feres doctrine -
[Representative] Frank. Not if, Mr. Vance. Is that correct?
Mr. Vance. The Feres doctrine applying, we would have that. 10 6
The Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee concluded
that the proposals of the contractors and the administration were an
unconstitutional interference with the vested causes of action of the
plaintiffs."7 Because of the adverse report of the Committee, neither
104. Id. at 40-41 (statement of Theodore Garrish). Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Robert Willmore testified to the same effect at congressional hearings on a proposed bill to repeal
the Warner Amendment in 1985: "[I]t was as a result of the development of these lawsuits,
particularly the very large growth in this litigation in California, that brought the contractors
and the administration to Congress, and that necessitated some congressional action; section
1631 [the Warner Amendment] was the result." Litigation Relating to Atomic Testing, supra
note 10, at 155 (testimony of Robert Willmore).
105. Litigation Relating to Atomic Testing, supra note 10, at 21-22.
106. Id. at 25.
107. "The Committee is concerned that [the amendment] would eliminate property interests
in pending causes of action in violation of the fifth amendment." HOUSE COMM. ADVERSE
REPORT, supra note 100, pt. 4, at 5 (Adverse Report submitted by S. Hall, House Committee on
the Judiciary). The Committee also concluded, "To eliminate the right to trial by jury in cases
against these contractors would violate the seventh amendment." Id.
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the contractors' nor the administration's proposed amendments
reached the floor of the House. But the contractors and the adminis-
tration did not give up.
The next year, the administration requested Senator Warner of Vir-
ginia, a former Secretary of the Navy and a member of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, to introduce the version favored by the
administration, under which the government would be substituted into
pending litigation in place of the defendant contractors. 10 8 Although
Senator Warner later testified that he was not aware of the nature of
the amendment that he was asked to introduce,"0 9 he obliged the
administration, introducing the legislation as a rider, or amendment,
to the Defense Department's then-pending appropriation bill. No
hearings were held on Senator Warner's amendment, and neither the
House nor the Senate Judiciary Committees ever saw or considered it.
Senator Warner's amendment was consistently misrepresented as it
made its way through the legislative process. 1 0 The report of the Sen-
ate Armed Services Committee described the Warner Amendment as
permitting "the consolidation of these many cases under the leader-
ship of the Department of Justice, with the United States as a co-
defendant." ' In actuality, of course, the amendment made the
United States the sole defendant, eliminating the contractors entirely
from the suits and preparing the way for dismissal when the United
States asserted its sovereign immunity. The Conference Committee
Report misrepresented the Warner Amendment in a slightly different
way. It stated, "This section would provide a remedy against the
United States for injury, due to loss of property, personal injury, or
death due to exposure to radiation emissions by a contractor carrying
out atomic weapons tests under a contract with, or under the direction
and control of, the United States."11 2 In actuality, of course, the
amendment did not "provide a remedy." Rather, it took away a rem-
edy that had been previously available against the contractors. The
"remedy" provided against the United States was non-existent because
of the sovereign immunity defense.
108. COMMITTEE OF THE CONFERENCE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT,
1985, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1080, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 349, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 4258, 4328 [hereinafter CONFERENCE COMM. REPORT].
109. Hearings on S. 982 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 10 (testimony
of Sen. Warner).
110. I have been unable to determine who was responsible for the misrepresentations I
describe in the text.
111. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, OMNIBUS DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
ACT, 1985, S. REP. No. 500, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 377 (1984) (emphasis added).
112. CONFERENCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 108, at 349.
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Deputy Assistant Attorney General Vance had admitted under
questioning by Representatives Hall and Frank in 1983 that the
administration's purpose was to obtain dismissals in the suits brought
by the atomic veterans. 113 Now, on the printed page with no question-
ing in prospect, the Warner Amendment was described as a benign,
even generous, provision under which the United States could inter-
vene as a co-defendant to whom the atomic veterans could look for a
remedy. Thus described, the Warner Amendment was approved with-
out debate by the House of Representatives on September 26,114 and
by the Senate on September 27, 1984.15 It was signed into law by
President Reagan on October 19.116
After the passage of the Warner Amendment, the United States
moved to be substituted in the pending litigation in the federal District
Court in the Northern District of California, and for summary judg-
ment based on the sovereign immunity defenses under Feres and the
discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. At
the time of the government's motions, virtually no discovery had taken
place. The District Court granted the government's motions,1 17 and
the Court of Appeals affirmed.118 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 11 9
From the standpoint of the contractors and the government, the
Warner Amendment accomplished two things. First, the government
saved an unknown but potentially large amount of money in attorneys'
fees and, possibly, in judgments. Given the existence of the indemnifi-
cation contracts between the contractors and the government, the gov-
ernment would have borne those expenses. Second, and probably
more important, the Amendment cut short the judicial process. Had
Congress permitted the suits to proceed, the plaintiffs would have been
able through civil discovery to compel the production of a great deal
of information about the manner in which the government and the
contractors carried out the atomic tests, about the numbers and identi-
ties of exposed veterans, about what the contractors and the govern-
ment knew of the hazards of radiation at the time of the tests, and
113. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
114. 130 CONG. REc. H10,323 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1984).
115. 130 CONG. REC. S10,202 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1984).
116. Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-525, § 1631, 98 Stat.
2492, 2646-2647 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2212 (West Supp. 1989)).
117. In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 616 F. Supp. 759 (N.D.
Cal. 1985), aff'd sub. noa., Konizeski v. Livermore Labs, 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988).
118. 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987).
119. 108 S. Ct. 1076 (1988).
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about the degree to which the government or the contractors con-
trolled the tests. That information is now unknown to the general
public, or is known only in a fragmentary and anecdotal way. From
what is now known, however, one may assume that the information is
likely to be highly embarrassing to both the contractors and the gov-
ernment. Had the suits gone to trial, much of the information
obtained through discovery would have been spread on the public rec-
ord in open court.
The story of the Warner Amendment may be summarized as fol-
lows. The government and the contractors jointly carried out atomic
weapons testing that exposed hundreds of thousands of soldiers and
civilians to significant amounts of radiation. During the course of
these tests, the soldiers and civilians were misled as to the degree of
danger to which they were being exposed. After the soldiers and civil-
ians became ill in significant numbers and began to seek redress, the
government took refuge behind the defense of sovereign immunity.
When the contractors-who did not share the government's sovereign
immunity-were sued, the government and the contractors secured by
subterfuge and misrepresentation the passage of a statute that retroac-
tively changed the legal rules governing the liability of the contractors.
The change of rules was specifically designed to avoid an unfavorable
outcome in suits already pending in the federal courts, and to provide
a sovereign immunity defense for acts that had never previously been
protected by that defense. To put it another way, the government and
the contractors declined to behave as ordinary litigants by relying on
the defenses that were available to the contractors. Rather, they inter-
fered with the judicial process by retroactively changing the rules to
their own advantage.
III. A VIOLATION OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
The question posed by the foregoing story is not whether the gov-
ernment and the contractors behaved appropriately in securing the
passage of the Warner Amendment. I consider it beyond serious
debate that they behaved reprehensibly. The question is, rather,
whether they behaved illegally.120 A number of powerful arguments
120. Academic commentary on the Warner Amendment has been uniformly unfavorable.
Titus & Bowers, Konizeski and the Warner Amendment: Back to Ground Zero for Atomic
Litigants, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REv. 387, 408 ("further action on compensation for downwinders or
repeal of the Warner Amendment will have to come from Congress. We would argue that either,
or both, actions are warranted."); Comment, Section 2212: A Remedy for Veterans-With a
Catch, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1513, 1558 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, A Remedy with a Catch]
("The courts should recognize the unfairness of the catch in section 2212 [§ 2212 is the Warner
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can be made against the Warner Amendment, including that it vio-
lates the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, 121 and that it violates
the jury trial guarantee of the Seventh Amendment. 22 I do not wish
to take away from the strength of those arguments, but I will focus
here on the argument that more than any other goes to the heart of
what is wrong with the Warner Amendment: it violates the principle
of separation of powers. 123
A. United States v. Klein 124
The principle of separation of powers prevents the concentration of
power in any single branch by confining a branch to the exercise of
only its own powers and forbidding it to interfere with the proper exer-
cise of power by another branch. In Justice Jackson's words in the
Steel Seizure Case, "the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty."'' 21 In the words of the Court in Buckley v. Valeo, sepa-
ration of powers is a "vital check against tyranny."1 26 Deciding what
are the powers to which a particular branch should be confined, and
what constitutes improper interference with the powers of another
branch, demands attention to the details of the particular action being
challenged.
Amendment] and refuse effect to this unconstitutional law."); Note, Constitutional Falloutfrom
the Warner Amendment: Annihilating the Rights of Atomic Weapons Victims, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1331, 1375 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Annihilating the Rights of Atomic Weapons Victims]
(Warner Amendment "undermines justice and fairness" and is "unconstitutional"); Note, 1985
Department of Defense Authorization Act: Leaving Atomic Veterans at Ground Zero, 20 VAL.
U.L. REV. 413, 444 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Leaving Atomic Veterans at Ground Zero] (Warner
Amendment is "disingenuous" and "constitutionally objectionable"); see also, Comment, The
Bomb Can Do No Wrong, supra note 45.
121. Note, Leaving Atomic Veterans at Ground Zero, supra note 119, at 435-440; Note,
Annihilating the Rights of Atomic Weapons Victims, supra note 120, at 1368-1375; Comment, A
Remedy with a Catch, supra note 120, at 1540-1557; HOUSE COMM. ADVERSE REPORT, supra
note 100, at 5.
122. HOUSE COMM. ADVERSE REPORT, supra note 100, at 5. An argument based on
substantive due process has also been advanced. Note, Leaving Atomic Veterans at Ground Zero,
supra note 120, at 440-443; Note, Annihilating the Rights of Atomic Weapons Victims, supra note
120, at 1356-1368.
123. A separation of powers argument is advanced in Comment, A Remedy with a Catch,
supra note 120, at 1517-1539. I have advanced a separation of powers argument in my
congressional testimony. Litigation Relating to Atomic Testing, supra note 10, at 180-182;
Government Liability for Atomic Weapons Testing Program, supra note 10, at 73-75; Hearings on
S. 982 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 10.
124. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
125. Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-635 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
126. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976).
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Modem cases provide very little help in analyzing what is wrong
with the Warner Amendment.127 The familiar landmarks generally
fall into two not particularly useful categories. First, many concern
contests between the executive and legislative branches. They include,
for example, the attempted seizure of privately owned steel mills by
the President without legislative authorization; 28 and, more recently,
the attempted delegation of power to the Comptroller General to sug-
gest budget cuts to the President;129 and the appointment of an
independent counsel to investigate and prosecute suspected criminal
acts by executive branch officials.13 0 Second, many are attempts to
accommodate strict notions of a tripartite government to the modern
administrative state. They include, for example, attempts to establish
or expand the jurisdiction of "legislative," or administrative, courts to
adjudicate questions that could be decided by Article III federal
courts,1 31 and the attempted one-house veto of an administrative
adjudication. 132
The only modem case of even arguable relevance is United States v.
Nixon, 113 in which the United States Supreme Court compelled the
production of tape recordings, made by the President of conversations
with his White House staff, for use in the criminal prosecution of one
of those staff members. The articulated rationale of the Court was
that the President could not interfere with the criminal process in the
127. The generally excellent modem academic literature on separation of powers is also
unhelpful because of its focus on contemporary cases. See, eg., Carter, From Sick Chicken to
Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent de-Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 719; Chemerinsky, A Paradox without a Principle: A Comment on the Burger Court's
Jurisprudence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1083 (1987); Sargentich, The
Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REv.
430 (1987); Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488 (1987); Strauss, Was There a Baby in the
Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789.
128. Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1953).
129. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
130. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. 2597 (1988).
131. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (Commodity
Futures Trading Commission may decide state law counterclaims in reparations proceeding
under Commodity Exchange Act); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473 U.S. 568 (1985)
(arbitration may decide right to sue for compensation of proprietary data, subject to limited
review by Article III court); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (Employees' Compensation
Commission may decide workers' compensation claim against employer, subject to review by
Article III court); see also Northern Pipeline Constr. v. Marathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. 50 (1982)
(Article I Bankruptcy Court may not decide state law contract claim); Palmore v. United States,
411 U.S. 389 (1973) (Article I federal court in the District of Columbia may decide criminal
case).
132. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
133. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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federal courts by withholding material evidence. 134 So understood,
the case can stand for the principle that the political branches cannot
interfere with an ongoing judicial proceeding. But this is a naive read-
ing of the case itself and an overreading of any principle it contains.
Nixon can only be understood against the backdrop of the impeach-
ment inquiry then under way in the House of Representatives, in
which these same tape recordings were being sought, and of the assist-
ance provided by the Supreme Court's order in averting a threatened
confrontation between the President and the Congress. I regard the
Court's proffered explanation under such circumstances as little more
than a plausible rationale for results reached on other (and possibly
fully legitimate) grounds. Further, the broad reading ignores the
unchallenged power of the executive branch to withhold evidence in
an ordinary criminal case, on pain of having the charge dismissed if
the evidence is sufficiently material to the case. ' 35
The uniqueness in this century of the Warner Amendment was not
understood by either of the two courts of appeals that have considered
it. For example, the Ninth Circuit, in Konizeski v. Livermore Labs,
concluded, "In adopting [the Warner Amendment], Congress broke
no new ground. In a number of other acts, Congress substituted the
[Federal Tort Claims Act] remedy against the government for reme-
dies available against private parties, and these acts have been uni-
formly upheld."' 36 The court cited two kinds of statutes in support of
its assertion that Congress "broke no new ground" with the Warner
Amendment. 
37
First, the court cited the Swine Flu Act, which provided that the
United States be substituted as a defendant for swine flu vaccine man-
134. Id. at 707:
To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as against a
subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized claim
of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would
upset the constitutional balance of 'a workable government' and gravely impair the role of
the courts under Art. III.
(emphasis added).
135. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 671-72 (1956) (quoting United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953)).
136. 820 F.2d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting 616 F. Supp. 759, 766 (N.D. Cal. 1985)), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988); see also Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 12-13 (1st Cir.
1986) ("This is not the first time Congress has substituted the government as defendant in a
certain category of tort suits and relegated plaintiffs to [a Federal Tort Claims Act] remedy.
Statutory schemes similar to § 2212 [the Warner Amendment] have been enacted in the Federal
Drivers Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(b)-(c) .. .and in the Swine Flu Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 247b(k)-(l)
(1976) (repealed 1978) .... These two acts have withstood constitutional challenges .....
137. 820 F.2d at 988.
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ufacturers in suits arising out of the swine flu inoculation program."'
But unlike the Warner Amendment, the Swine Flu Act was entirely
prospective.139 It was designed to induce the drug companies to man-
ufacture vaccine, and was passed into law before any vaccine was man-
ufactured and distributed. Moreover, unlike the Warner Amendment,
the Swine Flu Act did not permit any defenses for the government that
were not previously permitted to the vaccine manufacturers. All
immunities and exceptions for the Federal Tort Claims Act were
expressly waived."4 Thus, far from providing precedent and support
for the Warner Amendment, the Swine Flu Act provides a model for
what the Warner Amendment should have done but did not.
Second, the court cited a series of statutes under which the United
States is substituted as the defendant when employees of the govern-
ment are sued for torts.'4 1 These statutes include the Federal Drivers
Act, 142 and statutes covering health providers for the Armed
Forces, 43 the Foreign Service,"4 the Veterans Administration,145 and
the Public Health Service. 14' All of these statutes implement the long-
standing principle that damage suits against employees of the sover-
eign are, for purposes of sovereign immunity, suits against the sover-
eign itself. 47 Such suits have always been distinguished from suits
against independent contractors with the government, who are pro-
tected by the government contractors' defense but not by the full
extent of the government's sovereign immunity. 148
138. Id.; Pub L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b (West 1982
historical note) (revised and in pertinent part now repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-626, 92 Stat. 3574,
3583 (1978) 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b (West 1982 & Supp. 1989)).
139. 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b(k)(2)(A) ("The United States shall be liable with respect to claims
submitted after September 30, 1976 for personal injury or death arising out of the administration
of swine flu vaccine under the swine flu program").
140. Ird § 247(k)(2)(A)(ii) ("the exceptions specified in Section 2860(a) of title 28 [the Federal
Tort Claims Act], shall not apply in an action based upon the act or omission of a [Swine Flu]
program participant").
141. 820 F.2d at 988.
142. 28 U.S.C.A § 2679(b)-(c) (West 1965).
143. 10 U.S.C.A. § 1089 (West 1983).
144. 22 U.S.C.A. § 817 (West 1979) (repealed 1980).
145. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4116 (West 1979).
146. 42 U.S.C.A. § 233 (West 1982).
147. See, eg. Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215, 226-27 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that
Feres bars suits against officers of the United States as well as against the United States itself),
cerL denied, 462 U.S. 1118 (1983). "As officials of the federal Government, the eight named
officials/defendants in this suit are part of 'the Government he is serving' and are thus immune
from appellants' claims." Id. at 227.
148. See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814-16 (1976) (holding that suits against
federal contractors do not come within the Federal tort Claims Act because the government
does not "control the detailed physical performance of the contractor.").
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We must go back more than a century, to find a case comparable to
that presented by the Warner Amendment. t49 In United States v.
Klein, decided in 1878, the Supreme Court found a statute similar to
the Warner Amendment unconstitutional. After the Civil War,
southerners whose property had been confiscated by the Union
brought suit for recovery of the property or proceeds from its sale.
The 1863 statute under which recovery was permitted required that
the claimant never have "given any aid or comfort to the present rebel-
lion."' 5 ° A certain Wilson accepted the pardon of the President of the
United States and in return swore an oath of allegiance on February
15, 1865. Some time prior to Wilson's acceptance of the pardon,1
5 1
cotton belonging to him, valued at slightly over $125,000, had been
seized by the United States.152 After the war, the executor of Wilson's
estate, Klein, sued in the Court of Claims for recovery of the proceeds
of the sale of the cotton. The Court of Claims, relying on the pardon,
held that Wilson had been loyal within the meaning of the 1863 stat-
ute.' 53 Appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. While the appeal was
pending, the Supreme Court decided in United States v. Padelford, 154
as the Court of Claims had just held in Klein, that a presidential par-
don entitled a claimant to recovery irrespective of what the claimant
had actually done during the war.
Congress reacted to the Padelford case by adding an amendment to
the 1870-71 governmental appropriations bill then pending in Con-
gress, much as Senator Warner added his amendment to the then-
pending defense appropriation bill in 1984. The amendment provided
that a presidential pardon should not be regarded as proof of loyalty
under the 1863 act. 155 The consequence of the amendment was to
149. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). An exhaustive description and analysis of Klein may be
found in Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction and Processes: United
States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 1189.
150. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 131.
151. Id. at 148, 150 (Miller, J., dissenting) (arguing that Klein is different from Padelford on
the ground that the cotton was seized prior to the pardon).
152. Id. at 132.
153. The Court of Claims originally gave judgment to Klein on the assumption that Wilson
had not been disloyal. Kline [sic] v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 559 (1868), aff'd, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
128 (1871). The case was later reopened at the request of the government on the ground that
Wilson had served as a surety on the bond of a quartermaster in the confederate army. Klein v.
United States, 7 Ct. Cl. vii addenda; Young, supra note 149, at 1199. This fact was stipulated,
and the Court of Claims then found Wilson loyal on the strength of his presidential pardon. 7
Ct. Cl. at vi addenda.
154. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870).
155. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 134:
[I]n all cases where judgment shall have been heretofore rendered in the Court of Claims in
favor of any claimant [through proof of loyalty based on a presidential pardon the Supreme
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require the Supreme Court to dismiss the case, not merely the appeal,
if the claimant relied on a presidential pardon.1 56 Confiscated prop-
erty cases where the claim rested on any other ground were unaffected
by the statute. When Klein came before the Court, the government
moved for dismissal of the case.1
57
The Supreme Court refused to dismiss, on two grounds. One,
which does not concern us, was that Congress did not have the power
by statute to interfere with the President's pardoning power.15 8 The
other, which is directly relevant to the Warner Amendment, was that
Congress had violated the separation of powers: "The court is
required [under the challenged statute] to ascertain the existence of
certain facts and thereupon to declare that its jurisdiction on appeal
has ceased, by dismissing the bill. What is this but to prescribe a rule
for the decision of a cause in a particular way? . . . Can we do so
without allowing one party to the controversy to decide it in its own
favor? Can we do so without allowing that the legislature may pre-
scribe rules of decision to the Judicial department of the government
in cases pending before it? We think not.... We must think that
Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legis-
lative from the judicial power."' 159
Modern academic readings of Klein have focussed on the with-
drawal of jurisdiction dictated by the statutel'°---in part because of the
temporal pairing with the great jurisdiction withdrawing case of the
post-Civil War period, Ex parte McCardle, 61 and in part because of
twentieth century concerns with congressional withdrawals of jurisdic-
tion as a way of influencing the Supreme Court or of avoiding its deci-
Court] shall, on appeal, have no further jurisdiction of the cause, and shall dismiss the same
for want of jurisdiction.
156. The statute did more than require that the Supreme Court dismiss the appeal in Klein.
If the appeal had been dismissed, Klein's judgment would have been left intact. Congress
intended, and the Court understood, the statute to require the dismissal of the cause of action.
See Young, supra note 149, at 1203-09, for a description of the debates in Congress on this point.
157. The United States moved "that the case be remanded to the Court of Claims with a
mandate that the same be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, as now required by law." 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) at 134.
158. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147. The Court gave this reason second, after its discussion of the
separation of powers issue.
159. Id. at 146-47.
160. See, eg., Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 526-527 (1974); Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal
Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 910
(1984); Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress'
Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 71 (1981).
161. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
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sions. 162  The modem academic lesson drawn from Klein is obvious
enough-that Congress cannot use a jurisdictional withdrawal as a
means to an otherwise unconstitutional end. 163 That is, the Court will
not allow the fact that the statute operates as a jurisdictional with-
drawal or limitation to foreclose inquiry into what is actually accom-
plished by that withdrawal or limitation."6 In the words of the Klein
Court itself, the jurisdictional aspect of the statute was disregarded
because it was but "a means to an end."165
But the problem posed by the Warner Amendment is distinct from
the jurisdictional aspect of Klein that has preoccupied modem schol-
ars. The part of Klein relevant to the Warner Amendment is its hold-
ing unconstitutional what is actually accomplished by the statute-the
statute's "end"-rather than the Court's disregard of the statute's
jurisdictional garb. 166  The Klein Court explicitly concluded that in
162. The literature on this topic is enormous. See, e.g., in addition to the sources cited supra
note 160, Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L.
REV. 1030 (1981-1982); Baucus & Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on the
Constitution, the Courts, and Congress; 27 VILL. L. REV. 988 (1981-1982); Ervin, The
Constitutional Power of Congress Over Federal Courts, 68 A.B.A. J. 1536 (1982); McClellan,
Congressional Retraction of Federal Court Jurisdiction to Protect the Reserved Powers of the
States: The Helms Prayer Bill and a Return to First Principles, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1019 (1981-
1982); Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts:
4 Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1975); Tushnet and Jaff, Why the
Debate Over Congress' Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is Unending, 72
GEo. L.J. 1311 (1984).
163. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 160, at 910 ("even if Congress can withdraw jurisdiction
from the federal courts in a whole class of cases, it cannot allow a federal court jurisdiction but
dictate the outcomes of cases, or require a court to decide cases in disregard of the
Constitution"); Rice, Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction: The Constitutional Basis for the
Proposal in Congress Today, 65 JUDICATURE 190, 194 (1981)(symposium)("The statute in Klein
was declared unconstitutional because, under the guise of limiting jurisdiction, it attempted to
dictate to the Court how and by what processes it should decide the outcome of a particular class
of cases."); Sager, supra note 160, at 71 ("It was clear to the Klein Court that Congress could not
manipulate jurisdiction to secure unconstitutional ends."); P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN,
& D. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
369 (3d ed. 1988) ("Does Klein in fact do more than hold that it is an unconstitutional invasion
of the judicial function when Congress purports, not to withdraw appellate jurisdiction
completely, but to bind the Court to reverse a decision below in accordance with a rule of law
independently unconstitutional on other grounds?").
164. Accord Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 887 (1948).
165. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145 (1872).
166. One could argue that the Warner Amendment is a restriction on the jurisdiction of the
federal courts by pointing to the sovereign immunity defense that the United States employs after
the amendment permits its substitution as a defendant. The sovereign immunity defense is, in its
origin, a kind ofjurisdictional defense in which the sovereign asserts that the court does not have
jurisdiction to provide a remedy against an unconsenting sovereign. See, e.g., Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), in which the State of Georgia asserted that it was immune
from suit in federal court on the claim of private citizen for money damages, and declined to
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passing a statute effectively dictating the outcome of the pending case,
Congress had overstepped its authority and had improperly intruded
into the authority of the judiciary.
What, precisely, was the basis for the Klein Court's conclusion?
Two factors are readily apparent. Congress passed the statute in
direct response to the Court's decision in Padelford, intending to
change the outcome in the pending appeal in Klein. Further, it did so
as an interested party in the sense that the changed outcome favored
the government at the expense of the private litigant. One may con-
clude that these two factors, taken together, are enough to make the
statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court in United States v. Sioux
Nation of Indians has recently characterized Klein in much this way,
explaining that the Court held the statute unconstitutional because "it
prescribed a rule of decision in a case pending before the courts, and
did so in a manner that required the courts to decide a controversy in
the Government's favor."' 6 7 Yet the Court's explanation in Sioux
Nation may sweep too broadly. Without more, it could mean that ret-
roactive effect could never be given to a statute that favors the govern-
ment in pending litigation, no matter how unimportant the pending
litigation was in motivating the passage of the statute, and no matter
how compelling the forward-looking reasons behind its passage.
The basis for invalidating the statute in Klein is actually stronger
than that proposed by the Court in Sioux Nation, for there was an
additional factor not included in the Sioux Nation formulation. The
statute at issue in Klein did not apply to pending litigation by happen-
stance; rather, Congress' desire to change the outcome in pending
cases significantly motivated its adoption of the statute.1 6  With that
added factor, the result in Klein seems correct, even obvious.
Strong as the rationale for invalidating the statute in Klein is, it is
stronger still for invalidating the Warner Amendment. In Klein, the
statute, if upheld, would have had prospective (and intended) conse-
quences for primary conduct, for it would have affected future presi-
appear on the ground that the federal court had no jurisdiction over it. I regard the sort of
jurisdiction at issue in a claim of sovereign immunity as different from that at issue under the
Exceptions Clause of Article 11. But even if we conclude arguendo that the two sorts of
jurisdiction are the same, we are brought back to Klein: regulation of jurisdiction cannot be used
as a mechanism for accomplishing an otherwise unconstitutional aim.
167. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 404 (1980).
168. This motivation for the statute is evidenced, among other things, by the terms of the
statute itself. It specifically applied to appeals in which the judgment had already gone for the
claimant in the Court of Claims. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 134 ("in all cases where judgment shall
have been heretofore rendered in the Court of Claims in favor of any claimant"); see also, Young,
supra note 149, at 1203-09.
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dential pardons as well as pardons already given. In other words, the
Klein statute had a non-pretextual purpose of regulating future con-
duct. The Warner Amendment can make no such claim. Although
the statute is written in terms that encompass ongoing testing of
nuclear weapons, 1 69 large-scale exposure to atomic radiation during
tests ended in 1963 when the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty required
the abandonment of atmospheric testing of atomic weapons.17o There
have been no massive exposures of soldiers for over twenty-five years,
and there are none in prospect. There has been some exposure of
downwinders due to accidental "venting" from underground explo-
sions, 171 but on a greatly reduced scale from the exposure resulting
from the atmospheric explosion. In fact, the purpose of the Warner
Amendment was entirely retroactive. Its sole purpose was to change
the result in litigation arising out of events long past and not likely
ever to be repeated.
B. General Principles
The conclusion that follows from a parsing of Klein is reinforced by
more general thinking about the appropriate roles of the judicial and
legislative branches. Attempts to isolate and define the essence of the
judicial and executive roles are often simplistic or misleading, for the
functions served by the different branches are complex, multifarious,
and overlapping. But an essentialist approach can be useful in certain
plain cases, of which the Warner Amendment is one. 172
The analysis begins with the elementary stuff of civics lessons. The
essential role of the judiciary is to decide actual disputes between liti-
gants, based on rules in effect at the time of the parties' actions. 173
The essential law-making role of the legislature is to pass prospective
laws of general application to be applied by the judiciary. 174 The judi-
ciary can, and does, decide cases based on common law rules that are
newly created in the course of the decision, but the new rule must be
169. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2212(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
170. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests, August 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No.
5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
171. See, e.g., J. FULLER, supra note 78, at 182-86, 200, 237-240.
172. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) ("Since we conclude that the
legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh Presidential privilege, it is necessary to
resolve those competing interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions of each
branch. ') (emphasis added).
173. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); M. EISENBERG, THE
NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988).
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 203 (Da Capo Press reprint ed. 1970) (1833).
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fairly derivable from pre-existing rules or principles.17 Similarly, the
legislature can in some circumstances pass statutes that apply retroac-
tively to attach new consequences to completed acts, but the change
cannot be too radical a departure from the prior law and must accom-
pany the prospective application of that same rule. 76
The Warner Amendment is inconsistent with these principles. If
the Warner Amendment is permitted to become a legitimate mode of
retroactive rule change, the legislature may interfere with pending liti-
gation to avoid a feared result whenever it likes. It need not justify its
action by arguing that the new rule is derived from pre-existing rules
or principles. Nor need it limit its action to situations where the new
law has a plausible prospective application. The legislature may sim-
ply change the rule because it suits its purpose to do so. The reasons
need be no more dignified than the government's desire to avoid hav-
ing to honor an indemnification contract with a litigant, or its desire to
avoid having embarrassing information discovered by the litigants and
revealed to the general public during trial.
Finally, the courts ordinarily accord a strong presumption of consti-
tutionality177 to any legislation that is enacted in accordance with the
formally required process. 171 We should be very reluctant to abandon
the presumption when a statute has fulfilled the formal prerequisites,
but in certain circumstances such an abandonment may be justified. 179
The reason behind the presumption is that if Congress has seriously
considered and then passed a statute, the judiciary should not lightly
upset the (often implicit) Congressional judgment that the statute is
constitutional 8 Such an assumption seems to me fully warranted in
175. See, eg., R. DWORKIN, supra note 173; M. EISENBERG, supra note 173; Wellington,
Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83
YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
176. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986) (change of
statute in already heavily regulated area); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934) (substitution of one remedy for another); see also Battaglia v. General Motors, 169 F.2d
254 (2d Cir. 1948), cert denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948) (curative legislation).
177. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV.
L. REV. 129 (1893).
178. We may analogize this to Professor Hart's "rule of recognition." H. L. A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 97-107 (1961).
179. For a similar but more far-reaching suggestion, see C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 85-86 (1969) (suggesting that lack of consideration by
Congress, and understanding by the President, is ground for judicial skepticism).
180. Compare Chief Justice Marshall's rationale for deferring to the constitutional judgment
of Congress in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819):
The bill for incorporating the bank of the United States did not steal upon an
unsuspecting legislature, and pass unobserved. Its principle was completely understood, and
was opposed with equal zeal and ability. After being resisted, first in the fair and open field
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cases where there is evidence that Congress has actually given thought
to the constitutionality of a statute, and even where there is no evi-
dence on the point. 8 '
But the rationale behind the presumption in favor of the constitu-
tionality of duly enacted legislation only emphasizes the unusual
nature of the Warner Amendment. Congress did give serious consid-
eration to the constitutionality of the amendment. But that fact cuts
against, rather than in favor of, the presumption. After the 1983 hear-
ings before a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, the
committee found that the proposed statute was unconstitutional, and
the bill was killed because of the committee's adverse report. The next
year, the amendment was introduced as a rider to a defense appropria-
tion bill. No committee hearings were held, and the amendment was
consistently misrepresented in the covering legislative reports as pro-
viding, instead of denying, a remedy against the government for those
injured or killed by radiation. Thus, in the case of the Warner
Amendment, we do not have evidence of Congress having concluded
that the statute was constitutional; nor do we have a simple absence of
evidence about congressional deliberations. We have, instead, affirma-
tive evidence that the one body in Congress that seriously considered
the amendment found it unconstitutional. Moreover, we know that
the bill was passed thereafter only by avoiding hearings and misrepre-
senting the bill's character. Under such circumstances, the Warner
Amendment can hardly lay claim to the traditional presumption in
favor of a statute's constitutionality.
IV. CONCLUSION
The soldiers and civilians exposed to radiation during the atomic
bomb testing may rightly ask what kind of country they have served.
Our ideals of truth, fair play, and justice under law are hardly in evi-
dence at any point in this sorry tale. Holding an act of Congress
unconstitutional is a serious business. It is a particularly serious busi-
ness when the ground for so holding is that Congress improperly inter-
fered with the judiciary, for in such a case the judiciary is in some
sense acting as. a judge in its own cause. Yet in the case of the Warner
of debate, and afterwards in the executive cabinet, with as much persevering talent as any
measure has ever experienced, and being supported by arguments which convinced minds as
pure and as intelligent as this country can boast, it became a law.... It would require no
ordinary share of intrepidity to assert that a measure adopted under these circumstances
was a bold and plain usurpation, to which the constitution gave no countenance.
181. See generally, Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter
Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REv. 57 (1986).
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Amendment the interference by Congress with the judicial role is so
extraordinary, and the reasons for Congress' interference are so egre-
gious, that the federal judiciary has no choice. So far, however, the
judiciary has failed to find the Warner Amendment unconstitutional,
and Congress, despite repeated pleas, has failed to repeal it. In a nar-
row sense, only the soldiers and civilians suffer from this wrong. But
in a broader sense, we all suffer. If the Warner Amendment remains
law, it diminishes the "vital check against tyranny" that protects us
all.
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